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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
The Law Office of Fox Kohler & Associates, P.L.L.C., Arthur M. Kohler, and 
Rosanna Fox (collectively, the “Law Firm”) appeal the District Court’s order denying a 
motion to compel arbitration.  Because we conclude that the arbitration agreement at 
issue is valid and applies to statutory claims, we will vacate the order and remand with 
instructions to compel arbitration. 
I.  BACKGROUND1 
In 2013, Caren Frederick entered into a Professional Legal Services Agreement 
(the “Agreement”) with the Law Firm to help negotiate her accounts with creditors, “[t]he 
 
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent.  
1 Resolving the questions on appeal requires only our consideration of the 
Agreement’s arbitration provision and choice of law provision.  We accordingly limit the 
scope of the background to the information that is pertinent to our decision. 
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goal [being] to resolve each account, one by one, based on what the creditor agrees to 
settle for and [her] available reserves.”  (App. at 132a; App. At 107a, ¶ 14.)  Six years 
later, she filed suit against the Law Firm for allegedly engaging in racketeering, 
consumer fraud, and unlawful debt adjustment practices, in violation of various New 
Jersey laws.  Frederick brought the suit on behalf of herself and “a class composed of all 
citizens or residents of the State of New Jersey who executed agreements with or 
received services from, or on whose behalf was established trust or escrow accounts 
maintained or utilized by the [Law Firm] in a bank or other financial institution into 
which monies of the class members were transferred or deposited for the purpose of or 
relating to services provided by the [Law Firm] in connection with debt adjustment or 
credit counseling services.”  (App. at 73a-74a, ¶ 63.)  
The Law Firm moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the following provision in 
the parties’ Agreement:  
Each party agrees to enter into good faith discussions and if needed, allow 
up to 180 days to seek resolution prior to either party filing a formal 
complaint.  Any dispute that cannot be resolved between the parties after 180 
days must be resolved by binding arbitration that replaces the right to go to 
court before a judge or a jury which may limit each party’s right to discovery 
and appeal.  This agreement shall be submitted for binding arbitration in 
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association 
[(“AAA”)].  Neither party may bring a class action suit or other 
representative action in court, nor bring any claim in arbitration as a class 
action or other representative action.  The laws of the State of DE shall 
govern this agreement[.]  
(App. at 109a, ¶ 32.)  The District Court denied the Law Firm’s motion.  
Notwithstanding the Agreement’s Delaware choice of law provision, the Court 
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applied the law of the forum state, New Jersey, and held the Agreement’s 
arbitration provision to be unenforceable.  The Law Firm has timely appealed.     
II.  DISCUSSION2 
The Law Firm argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the 
Agreement’s arbitration provision is invalid.  First, it contends that the arbitration 
provision would have been found valid had the Court applied Delaware law in 
accordance with the terms of the Agreement.  Next, it argues that the Court’s construction 
of New Jersey law on arbitrability was erroneous.  Lastly, it challenges the enforceability 
of New Jersey law on arbitrability, contending that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) 
preempts it.   
A.  Choice of Law3 
We “apply the choice of law rules of the forum state to determine what substantive 
law will govern.”  Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 73 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  So, 
here, we apply New Jersey’s choice of law rules.  However, “[b]efore a choice of law 
question arises, there must first be a true conflict between the potentially applicable 
bodies of law.”  Id. at 74 (citation omitted).  A true conflict exists “when the application 
 
2 We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1) to review an order denying a 
motion to compel arbitration.  Zimmer v. CooperNeff Advisors, Inc., 523 F.3d 224, 228 
(3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a).   
3 “Since choice of law analysis involves a purely legal question, we exercise 
plenary review.”  NL Indus., Inc. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 
1995) (citation omitted). 
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of one or another state’s law may alter the outcome of the case[.]”  In re Accutane Litig., 
194 A.3d 503, 517 (N.J. 2018) (citation omitted).   
The Law Firm contends that there is a true conflict between New Jersey and 
Delaware law concerning arbitration, with Delaware applying a more deferential standard 
for enforcing arbitration provisions.  Delaware courts hold that a contract’s general 
provision “for arbitration of all disputes” and its incorporation of “rules that empower 
arbitrators to decide arbitrability[,]” such as the AAA rules incorporated here, “evidences 
a clear and unmistakable intent to submit [all issues, including] arbitrability issues[,] to 
an arbitrator.”  James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie Gary, LLC, 906 A.2d 76, 80 (Del. 2006).  
But New Jersey courts might well render that same contract language unenforceable 
because it “does not explain what arbitration is, nor does it indicate how arbitration is 
different from a proceeding in a court of law.  Nor is it [necessarily] written in plain 
language that would be clear and understandable to the average consumer that she is 
waiving statutory rights.”  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 99 A.3d 306, 315 (N.J. 
2014); see also id. at 313 (“[A]n average member of the public may not know—without 
some explanatory comment—that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one’s 
claim adjudicated in a court of law.”).  It therefore appears that there is a true conflict 
between Delaware and New Jersey law on this point.  Despite that, however, we need not 
decide which state’s law applies because, even under the more stringent rule for 
enforcing arbitration agreements, the Law Firm prevails.  We will therefore assume for 
purposes of analysis that New Jersey law applies.   
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B.  Arbitrability4 
“Because the underlying principle of all arbitration decisions is that arbitration is 
strictly a matter of consent, the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements 
according to their terms.”  In re Remicade Antitrust Litig., 938 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 
2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  In doing so, we “must consider 
two gateway questions: (1) whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all 
(i.e., its enforceability), and (2) whether a concededly binding arbitration [agreement] 
applies to a certain type of controversy (i.e., its scope).”  Id. (quoting Lamps Plus, Inc. v. 
Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416-17 (2019)) (internal quotation marks and other citations 
omitted).  State law governs both gateway questions, but “due regard must be given to the 
federal policy favoring arbitration.”  Jaludi v. Citigroup, 933 F.3d 246, 255 (3d Cir. 
2019) (citation omitted).  Accordingly, we employ a presumption of arbitrability at the 
second gateway question.  Id.   
1.  The arbitration provision is valid 
When “an average member of the public may not know—without some 
explanatory comment—that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one’s claim 
adjudicated in a court of law[,]” New Jersey “courts take particular care in assuring the 
knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the 
ramifications of that assent.”  Atalese, 99 A.3d at 313.  While “[n]o particular form of 
 
4 “We exercise plenary review over questions of law concerning the applicability 
and scope of arbitration agreements.”  Zimmer, 523 F.3d at 228 (citation omitted). 
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words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights[,]” an 
arbitration provision will pass muster if it, “at least in some general and sufficiently broad 
way, … explain[s] that the plaintiff is giving up her right to bring her claims in court or 
have a jury resolve the dispute.”  Id. at 314-16.   
That standard is met here.  The Agreement’s arbitration provision explains that 
arbitration “replaces the right to go to court before a judge or jury” and further states that 
arbitration “may limit each party’s right to discovery and appeal.”  (App. at 109a, ¶ 32.)  
Additionally, it states that “[a]ny dispute that cannot be resolved between the parties after 
180 days must be resolved by binding arbitration” and that the Agreement “shall be 
submitted for binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association[,]” thereby both clarifying that arbitration is the singular way for the parties 
to resolve their disputes and establishing the rules that will govern the arbitration.  (App. 
at 109a, ¶ 32 (emphases added).)  The Agreement’s arbitration provision makes “clear 
and understandable to the average consumer” that she is waiving her right to bring suit in 
a judicial forum.  Atalese, 99 A.3d at 315.  We, therefore, conclude that the arbitration 
provision is enforceable.  
2.  The arbitration provision includes statutory claims 
The arbitration provision is also “sufficiently broad to encompass reasonably 
[Frederick’s] statutory causes of action.”  Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872, 883 
(N.J. 2002).  It expressly includes “[a]ny dispute that cannot be resolved between the 
parties after 180 days[.]”  (App. at 109a, ¶ 32.)  That provision is “‘clear and 
unambiguous’ in [its] intent and purpose to inform the reader that all disputes must be 
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presented in an arbitral forum, not a court.”  Curtis v. Cellco P’ship, 992 A.2d 795, 802 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  Moreover, New Jersey courts have 
consistently held that such broad language will encompass statutory claims, particularly 
in the absence of “a limiting reference to a contract.”  See Moon v. Breathless Inc., 868 
F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2017) (applying New Jersey law and noting that “the court found 
that the contract was sufficiently broad because … it did not make a limiting reference to 
a contract”); compare Martindale, 800 A.2d at 884 (“[T]he arbitration provision here 
does not contain any limiting references[.]”), with Curtis, 992 A.2d at 802.   
Hence, the Agreement’s arbitration provision is enforceable as to both contractual 
and statutory claims, and Frederick must resolve her claims in arbitration with the Law 
firm, according to the terms of the Agreement.5   
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying the 
Law Firm’s motion to compel arbitration and remand with instructions to grant the 
motion. 
 
5 Consequently, we do not address the Law Firm’s remaining argument regarding 
preemption. 
